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Italian banking foundations are important institutional investors and not-for-
profit institutions in Italy. Foundations finance their activities with the returns 
they get by investing their endowments on the financial markets. The financial 
management of foundations has to meet two conflicting aims: maintaining a 
consistent and sufficient spending level in the short run and preserving the 
real value of the endowment fund in the long run. During the financial crisis, 
the tension between these aims has strongly emerged. This paper is about 
the results of an analysis of the spending decisions of ten main foundations, 
from 2004 to 2016, based on balance sheet and market value data. We 
propose an error-component model that allows to evaluate the relative 
importance of spending stability versus preserving the endowment value. Our 
estimates reveal that, on average, foundations followed stable spending 
policies across the financial crises, as they did not change their long-term rate 
of consumption of assets but gradually started to smooth spending over the 
short term. Because their granting activity sharply declined from 2008 to 2012, 
the joint effect of these decisions was to persistently reduce spending until 
2016. This conservative stance, if carried over beyond the short-term, may 
violate intergenerational neutrality. 
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Italian foundations of banking origin are private institutions operating in the 
non-profit sector, whose resources for socially useful interventions derive 
from the management of assets that, at the time of their creation, were 
represented by the shareholdings in the capital of Italian banks. These bodies, 
in fact, originate from the process of privatization of public credit institutions, 
started with Law n. 218 of 30 July 1990 (the so called ‘Amato Law’ after the 
name of the then Italian Prime Minister) and the related implementing decrees. 
Through this important regulatory intervention, the banking activity of the 
savings banks (‘Casse di Risparmio’ and Monti di Credito’ in Italian) and credit 
institutes of public law was separated and allocated to joint-stock companies, 
ruled by the Civil Code and banking regulations. Therefore, the original 
institutions were transformed into no-profit public entities – the current 
foundations of banking origin – with the attribution of the entire shareholding 
of the banking company. The shareholding in the capital of the transferee 
bank therefore represented the foundations’ initial assets, destined to the 
realization of purposes of public interest and social utility.  
In 1990, the year of approval of the Amato Law, there were 82 savings 
banks, with an average size, calculated in terms of intermediated funds, equal 
to 3,912 billion Italian Lire; a size that reflected the (mainly) local nature of 
credit activity, similar and in competition with that of cooperative credit banks 
(known as ‘Banche Popolari and Casse rurali ’). The dimensional and territorial 
scale of public-law credit institutions was different. They included the three 
large southern banks (Banco di Napoli, Banco di Sicilia and Banco di 
Sardegna), as well as Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
and Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino. These six institutions, together with 
the three banks of national interest, represented the most important 
component of the banking system in terms of total assets. At the end of 1990 
the average size of the six public law institutes was 44,099 billion Italian Lire, 






The current distribution by size and geography of the 88 foundations 
that emerged from that process shows how, even today, their link with the 
history of the Italian banking system is resistant; even more, it emphasizes 
how foundations have maintained a local identity, becoming independent 
from the consolidation and reorganization processes that have affected Italian 
banks. At the end of 2016, only 12 foundations reported assets worth more 
than one billion euro - representing more than 68 percent of the total system 
- while 30 were those that did not exceed 100 million euro – 3 percent of the 
total. The geographical distribution was concentrated in central and northern 
Italy; in fact, the foundations operating in the south and in the islands were 
only 11, with a total assets equivalent to just 5 percent of the total system. 
The evolution of the relationship between foundations and banks was 
accompanied and prompted by changes in the regulatory framework, which 
saw three important interventions in the first two decades of their life. The first, 
in 1994 (Law No. 474/94 and the enforcing ‘Dini directive’, after the name of 
the then Minister of Economy and Finance) abolished the initial obligation to 
hold control of the transferring banks and introduced tax incentives to 
encourage diversification of assets. In 1998, the ‘Ciampi Law’ (Law No. 
461/98, named after the successor of Mr. Dini), which is still today the 
legislative frame of reference for foundations, introduced the obligation to sell 
the controlling shares in the capital of the transferring banks by the end of 
2005, from which, subsequently, foundations with net assets less than € 200 
million and those based in regions with special status were exempted. The 
last intervention in terms of diversification is the one included in the 
Memorandum of Understanding signed on 22 April 2015 by ACRI (the Italian 
Savings Banks Association, which gathers all 88 foundations of banking 
origin) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The Protocol provides for 
the limitation to 33 percent of total assets invested in financial instruments 
attributable to a single issuer – with both amounts expressed at fair value. 
Thanks to this agreement, whose implementation must take place over a 
three-year or five-year period, depending on whether transferring bank shares 
are listed or unlisted, the conditions have been set to accentuate the 
diversification process that had characterized the financial activity of 
foundations until the outbreak of the financial crisis. In fact, in the years of the 





foundations interrupted the diversification process and contributed 
significantly to the subscription of capital increases initiated by their reference 
banks. It was an intervention that, while on the one hand has allowed the 
bailout of the banks most exposed to the crisis, on the other has accentuated 
the riskiness of the foundations' financial portfolios and has often affected 
their profitability and activities. In this sense, Table 1 shows some statistics 
that allow the assessment of the evolution of approved grants, of net income 




Grants and net income of all Italian 
banking foundations by periods 
 
 
Source: Authors calculations on ACRI data 
 
The average annual value of grants decreased by 26 percent (366 million euro 
in total each year for all foundations) during the period and the average net 
income by 55 percent (totaling 1,458 million euro for all foundations); median 
values have recorded smaller but still very significant declines – 22 and 39 per 
cent, respectively. This compared to a cumulative inflation rate between 2004 
and 2016 equal to 22.5 percent. The increase in the ratio of grants to net 
income, whose median has risen from 58 to 71 percent, reveals that 
Periods 2004-08 2009-16
Percentile 25 1.8 1.5
Mean 16.1 11.9
Median 4.0 3.1
Percentile 75 9.6 8.4
Percentile 25 2.6 1.0
Mean 30.1 13.6
Median 6.4 3.9




Percentile 75 90.3 103.3
Grants (Euro mln.)
Net income (Euro mln.)





foundations have tried to protect, at least in part, the level of grants from the 
uncertainty of the returns to their financial assets. The cost of this effort was 
inevitably dumped into net asset value which, at balance sheet values, was 
on average 527 million euro up to 2008 and 493 million euro later; a 6.5 
percent drop at system level.  
Because of these considerations, we believe that it is worth 
investigating and better understanding the impact of the crisis on the financial 
management of foundations. The subject lends itself to be tackled from the 
points of view of the spending decisions of foundations and their implications 
for the conservation of endowments. The main questions to be answered are 
the following: were foundations spending policies sustainable over time 
without compromising assets values? To what extent did they ensure stable 
grants? How did foundations combine grant-stabilization strategies with long-
run spending objectives based on expected returns on their investments? 
To our knowledge, forty years after Italian banking foundations were 
born, there is not an important body of specific research that has dealt with 
these issues. To date, researchers have enough data in terms of detail and 
temporal depth to start filling this gap. The purpose of this work is to address 
the theme of foundations spending policies. To this end, we have 
reconstructed the time-series of values and market returns of the financial 
assets of ten major Italian banking foundations between 2004 and 2016, 
integrating them with balance sheet data that the Italian Savings Banks 
Association has collected every year since 2000. At the end of 2016 these ten 
foundations represented, as a whole, a large part of the Italian system, both 
in terms of total assets, which amounted to 28.5 billion euro, for a 61.5 percent 
share of the total system, and in terms of grants, over 389 million, or 63 
percent of the total. We are aware that this is not a statistically representative 
sample of the whole panorama of foundations, but nonetheless we believe 
that its overall size allows us to develop important reflections at a systemic 
level.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 frames the 
meaning of our research with respect to what exists in the relevant literature 
and to the specific characteristics of foundations. Section 3 describes how 





4 we illustrate the econometric techniques that we have used, present and 
comment the estimation results. Section 5 concludes1.   
 
1 The authors are grateful to the Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Modena, which contributed 
to the realization of this research by financing the project 'The asset management of the 







As far as we know, almost thirty years after Italian banking foundations were 
born, there is no significant body of research that has systematically dealt with 
the issue of their spending behavior. This fact is rather surprising given the 
importance that the system of foundations for the welfare of their reference 
communities and for supporting national banks during the financial crisis. 
A remarkable exception is the empirical study of Cardinal and Panza 
(2006) which presents the results of a sample survey involving the governing 
bodies of 250 European foundations between 2004 and 2005. Of the 
foundations involved, 40 were Italian; the authors do not indicate what was 
their nature, but it is reasonable to assume that most were of banking origin. 
The majority of respondents, in Italy as in the rest of Europe, declared that the 
main tasks of financial management are the conservation of assets and the 
generation of income to finance spending. This shows that, at the time, the 
fundamental tension between asset protection and spending was well 
perceived by the governing bodies of Italian foundations. On the other hand, 
respondents' opinions about long-term goals and spending decisions were 
geared towards assuming that investment performance – not only income, but 
also capital gains and losses – is not a relevant factor in making spending 
decisions. This indicates that there was little concern of the stringent 
relationship between return on investments and spending, while criteria such 
as income – from dividends, coupons and interest – and the actual needs for 
spending were favored; this evidence, as highlighted by the authors, was 
particularly strong in in Italy. 
We believe that there are substantial motivations that explain the 
attitudes that emerged from the study of Cardinal and Panza (2006) – which 
unfortunately was not repeated during or after the financial crisis, as it could 
have brought out useful indications regarding the possibility that such 
attitudes have changed over time. In the first place, the history of foundations, 
not only and not particularly in Italy, dates back to centuries ago (Acharya and 
Dimson, 2007). At the time, the assets of foundations consisted mainly of land 





exploitation. The value of such assets was little variable over time; it is 
therefore, we would say, natural that they were kept exclusively for the income 
they produced and that, consequently, this income was the only available 
resource to finance the activities of foundations. 
The second reason is probably linked to the specific origins of Italian 
banking foundations. As highlighted in the previous section, such foundations 
derive from the process of privatization of local credit institutions and of some 
banks of national interest; these were the entities from which foundations have 
inherited their mutualistic purposes and their mission of supporting families, 
businesses and institutions operating in the areas of art, culture, research and 
social projects (Acri, 2018). These aspects have consolidated the priority 
assigned to spending objectives, both in the legislation and in the vision of 
the governing bodies. Finally, in their first years of life and, in fact, up to the 
‘Ciampi Law’ of 1998, foundations had a clear connotation of ‘treasurers’ of 
the shareholdings they received by the banks. Most likely, this made it distant 
from the logic of financial management the possibility that the uses of their 
endowments would be modified with respect to the status quo; a 
circumstance which later found reinforcement in the fact that income 
distributed by the transferee banks was more than sufficient to finance the 
activities of the foundations themselves (Clarich and Pisanischi, 2001), at least 
until the outbreak of the financial crises. 
Contrary to what happens in the Italian research landscape, the theme 
of spending policies and, more generally, of the financial management of 
foundations, has long been widely explored in Anglo-Saxon literature. In the 
United States and in the United Kingdom, endowment funds of private 
universities are institutional investors with characteristics similar to those of 
Italian banking foundations. The purpose of endowment funds is to provide, 
over time, financial resources that, alongside the fees paid by students, public 
subsidies and revenues from research activities that can be sold on the 
market, support the current expenses and investments of the parent 
universities. Therefore, Italian banking foundations share with university 
endowments the objective of preserving the real value of the assets alongside 
that of permanently and consistently providing an amount of resources which 





However, there are important differences between Italian banking 
foundations and university endowments, since the latter originate from 
contributions from families and businesses, from which they continue to be 
nourished through the donations they currently receive; such circumstance 
does not belong to the Italian foundations, whose origin is public and for which 
it is atypical to benefit from donations. Furthermore, at the end of 2017, the 
overall size of the 88 Italian banking foundations in terms of assets was just 
over 46 billion euro (ACRI, 2018a). Data gathered from 809 U.S. colleges and 
universities for the 2017 Nacubo-Commonfund Study of Endowment 
(Nacubo, 2018) show that their overall size was 566.8 billion dollars in terms 
of endowment assets. At the same time, the average size of Italian banking 
foundations was 452 million euro, compared to 705 million dollars for 
endowment funds. Finally, endowment income constitutes only a fraction, 
albeit growing, of universities’ operating budgets. 
The financial management of university endowments has been the 
subject of considerable research since the mid-1970s. The most influential 
contribution that highlights the two crucial aspects of endowment 
management – spending and endowment conservation – is owed to James 
Tobin (1974) who pointed out that: (1) there is a trade-off between 
conservation of assets and (stabilization of) spending, and (2) what counts in 
the economic definition of profitability is not only accounting income – 
dividends, coupons and interest – but total return, which also takes into 
account the capital gains and losses at market values. In the words of Tobin: 
« The trustees of an endowment institution are the guardians of the 
future against the claims of the present. Their task is to preserve net 
assets among generations. The trustees […] assume the institution 
to be immortal. They want to know, therefore, the rate of 
consumption from endowment which can be sustained indefinitely 
[…] Consuming endowment income so defined means in principle 
that existing endowment can continue to support the same set of 
activities that is now supporting. […] Sustained consumption rises 
to encompass and enlarge the scope of activities when, but not 
before, capital gifts enlarge the endowment. » 
Consistently with Tobin’s concept of 'intergenerational neutrality' for 





time, endowments and foundations as well should provide a smooth flow of 
real income and current consumption should not arise from the prospect of 
further revenue sources that have not yet materialized. Therefore, the short-
term payout response to shocks that hit the assets of institutions should be 
small and endowments should respond symmetrically to positive and 
negative shocks. 
Back in the late 1970’s, James Tobin, who then acted as the trustee 
of Yale University’s endowment, together with economists Williams Brainard, 
Richard Cooper and William Nordhaus, conceived the first decision-making 
rule that links current spending to its past level and to the value of the 
endowment fund (Swensen, 2009). Today, it is known as the 'Yale-Stanford 
Rule'. This rule stipulates that current spending shall be equal to the weighted 
sum of previous year spending and a of target spending rate applied to the 
market value of endowment assets at the end of the previous year. The result 
is increased by the inflation rate of the basket of goods and services that are 
typically purchased by universities. The weight on past spending is called 
'smoothing'. The higher is smoothing, the more spending is stabilized from 
one year to the next and the more any variations of the value of the assets (in 
real terms) are discharged on the endowment. Therefore, when smoothing is 
high, current spending is stabilized at the expense of the opportunities for 
future spending, as we extensively explain in Appendix 2. The target 
spending-rate is the level of constant consumption of assets that is expected 
to be sustainable over the long-term, to foreseeable market and inflation 
conditions; in Appendix 2, we show that the dynamic equilibrium of an 
endowment is achieved when this rate is set as the difference between the 
expected total rate of return in investments and the expected inflation rate. 
 The rule was first adopted by the endowment of Yale in the late 1960’s. 
After the financial market shocks of the 1970’s, in 1982 the rule was revised 
to the current version in 1982 – described above; the smoothing parameter 
was set to 0.7 and the target spending-rate to 4.5 percent. Since then, Yale 
changed the smoothing and target-spending parameters only three times: in 
1992 and 1995, the target rate was increased to 4.75 and to 5 percent, in 2004 
this was increased to 5.25 and the smoothing parameter set to 0.8. Such 
changes were motivated by substantial variations of Yale’s investment style 





support; indeed, changing the rule infrequently is believed to be necessary for 
the enforcing of budgetary balance  (Yale Investment Office, 2004 and 2018).   
These concepts have been expanded in the later literature on 
endowment funds, which considers their assets as a form of precautionary 
savings that can be tapped by universities when other revenues are 
unexpectedly low. For Dybvig (1999) the portfolio and spending decisions 
should be inspired to the notion of expenditure protection over time; therefore, 
endowments should immunize a portion of their wealth through low-risk 
investments and allocate the remainder to risky assets. Black (1976) and 
Merton (1992) emphasize the idea of endowments as a form of self-insurance 
for universities, with the key role to smooth out the effects of temporary 
declines to their revenues. Specifically, Merton analyzes a dynamic portfolio 
choice model in which endowment payouts are only a part of a university’s 
overall revenue stream; he notes that, when the markets are incomplete, 
universities should adjust current payout rates in response to both 
endowment shocks and other revenue shocks. In this strain of the literature, 
the role of endowments as self-insurance funds implies a conservative payout 
behavior during rising markets, thus engaging in precautionary saving, and a 
more aggressive spending during bad times.  
However, there is evidence that endowments do not always stick to 
stable rules. Brown, Dimmock, Kang, and Weisbenner (2014) note that the 
majority of university endowments use a spending policy that sets payout 
amounts as a fraction of an average of past endowment market values,  
therefore only partially implementing the Yale-Stanford rule, with the effect 
that past shocks are gradually incorporated into payout decisions over several 
years. The authors also provide evidence that endowments asymmetrically 
reduce payouts by overriding their stated payout policies after negative, but 
not positive, market shocks. This behavior, which the authors call ‘endowment 
hoarding’, translates negative endowment shocks to universities budgets 
operation quite quickly. 
Contrary to the idea of a stable application spending policies, Brown 
and Tiu (2013) find that endowments adjust them quite often. Almost half of 
the endowments in their sample did adjust the rule at least once from 2003 to 





endowments, changes in payouts are more likely to follow low past returns 







Because of the arguments presented in the previous section, it is clear that 
the analysis of foundations’ spending policies cannot disregard the valuation 
at market values of net assets and of total investment returns. This 
assessment cannot be carried out directly on the basis of only the balance 
sheet and income statement data of foundations. In fact, the accounting rules 
that define the representation of the economic management of foundations 
allow to report some components of the financial portfolio as fixed assets, 
without recognizing any changes in their market price occurred during the 
fiscal year. This applies not only to some unlisted financial assets, but also to 
some of those traded on the markets, the principle being that they are long-
term investments held for the income they produce (e.g. dividends and 
coupons) and not for potential capital gains. Furthermore, banking 
foundations are granted the possibility of adjusting the value of their 
shareholdings in the transferee banks without charging or crediting the 
income statement. 
As a consequence, a correct evaluation of economic income that 
acknowledges the profits and losses accrued during the fiscal year requires 
an assessment of the current market values of fixed assets that make up the 
financial investment portfolios of foundations. The information necessary for 
this valuation can be found in the notes to financial statements that report the 
market values at the end of each year for listed securities and fair values for 
unlisted ones. 
In order to get a realistic representation of net assets and of the 
profitability of investments, we collected data at market values of the financial 
assets of the main ten Italian banking foundations at fiscal year-end. In 2016 
these foundations represented 61.5 percent of total assets (at book value) of 
the Italian banking foundations system, for a total of 28.5 billion euro, and 63 
percent of all grants, for over 389 million euro. Market data were integrated 





allowed us to build the historical series of net asset values and total returns of 
the ten foundations between 2004 and 20162. 
In figure 1 we show the evolution of the total assets expressed in terms 
of market and book value, respectively, for our sample. From this picture, it is 
apparent how the two measures differ, both in their levels and in their 
variations over the 2004-16 period. Indeed, the impact of the financial crisis 
on total assets at market value is clearly visible already from 2007, when the 
subprime crisis started. The effect of the Eurozone debt crisis is clearly visible 
from 2010 to 2011. On the other hand, the book value of total assets does not 
decrease until year 2011, when most foundations actually started to recognize 
the losses that they suffered over the 2007-2011 period; also notice that, as 
after 2011 some foundations recorded certain investment positions formerly 
represented as variable assets to fixed ones, the revaluation of total assets 
from 2013 to 2015 does not shows at book values. 
 
Figure 1 
Total assets of ten main foundations at market and book values (2004-16) 
 
The overall picture is that the wealth of the ten foundations declined 
significantly over the whole period. The market value of total assets was 34.4 
billions euro at the end of 2004, dropped to a minimum of 24.7 billions by 
2012, then recouped to 30.1 billions by the end of 2016; this is more than four 
 
2 In Appendix 1 we provide details of the calculations we carried out to compute total assets 




















billions euro less than in 2004, with a decline of about 12.5 percent. This was 
a large dent in the assets of foundations in the aftermath of the financial crises, 
which does not show at book values.  
 
Table 2 
Real grants, returns and net assets at market values for ten main foundations (2004-16) 
 
 
Using balance sheet data, we also calculated operating costs and 
grants for each of the ten foundations, the sum of which is total spending in 
each year. Table 2 shows the average annual values of grants, returns and net 
assets for our sample in the 2004-2016 period, expressed in real terms. Up to 
year 2008, the annual average of all foundations’ grants was 935 million euro 
at 2004 prices; this sharply declined to 539 million euro over the 2009-2013 
period, a 42 percent drop, when the effects of the financial crises displayed 
on net assets and net total returns were negative on average and very volatile. 
From 2013 onwards, average annual net assets recovered slightly, but by the 
end of 2016 they were still ten billion euro lower than in 2004. However, 
average grants continued to decline, sliding by 15 percent to 456 million euro. 
Euro mln. YoY % Euro mln. MW % Euro mln. CGR %
2004 699 – – – 34,239 –
2005 1,072 53.2 3,427 9.4 38,775 13.3
2006 1,130 5.5 6,266 15.2 43,472 12.1
2007 1,203 6.5 -868 -2.1 41,056 -5.6
2008 569 -52.7 -13,122 -39.0 26,153 -36.3
2009 758 33.3 3,939 14.4 28,667 9.6
2010 643 -15.1 -2,678 -10.0 25,063 -12.6
2011 303 -52.9 -974 -4.3 20,719 -17.3
2012 450 48.6 878 4.3 20,142 -2.8
2013 409 -9.2 3,606 17.1 21,919 8.8
2014 663 62.2 4,501 18.9 25,800 17.7
2015 434 -34.6 3,141 11.6 28,244 9.5
2016 318 -26.7 -2,815 -10.7 24,272 -14.1
Mean 665 1.5 442 2.1 29,117 -2.8
Mean 2004-08 935 3.1 -1,074 -4.1 36,739 -6.5
Mean 2009-12 539 3.5 291 1.1 23,648 -6.3
Mean 2013-16 456 -2.1 2,108 9.2 25,059 4.8
Grants Net returns Net assets
Year
Note: 'YoY %' is the percent annual variation, 'MW %' is the money-weighted rate of return,
'CGR %' is the percent annual growth rate. Adjustments for inflation are based in the Oecd





Therefore, foundations seem to have significantly reduced their activity 
after the beginning of the financial crises, perhaps reacting to the reduction in 
net assets that it implied and to an increased uncertainty of investment 
returns. This picture becomes clearer when one looks at the evolution of the 
components of total spending over time and at how much of available 
financial resources the latter absorbed. 
 
Table 3 
Mean of grants, operating costs and total spending for ten main foundations by periods 
 
 
Table 3 shows, along with per-foundation average annual grants, 
operating costs and total spending, this time at current prices, the ratios of 
spending to net assets and net income by period. Over the entire period, 
about 88 percent of total spending is attributable to grants and 12 percent to 
operating costs. The latter, however, are the most rigid component of 
spending. In fact, compared to the substantial reduction in grants from 2008 
to 2012, operating costs tended to increase. The compression of spending 
during the crisis, from 104 to 70 million euro on an annual average, did not 
immediately determine a fall of its incidence on net assets, which was just 0.1 
percent lower than before; however, as net income at book value fell more 
than net assets because of the reduction in interest, dividends, coupons and, 
in some cases, of the recognition of capital losses, the incidence of spending 
on it actually increased, from 69 to 79 percent. From 2013 onwards, grants 
continued to decline, reaching an average of 56 million euro, while operating 
costs did not, being stable at about 9 million euro. As net assets recouped 
from the 2012 levels, the spending rate on them further fell to 2.1 percent.  
All of these elements suggest that, with the unfolding of the financial 
crises, there has been a change in the spending policies of Italian banking 
foundations, which became more gradually more conservative. This stance 
seems to have persisted after year 2012, implying a sizeable reduction of 
Euro mln. % of Total Euro mln. % of Total Euro mln. % on Net 
assets
% on Net 
income
All years 73.4 88.4 8.2 11.6 81.6 2.5 76.6
2004-08 97.3 92.8 6.9 7.2 104.2 2.7 68.7
2009-12 61.3 86.1 8.9 13.9 70.1 2.6 79.3
2013-16 55.6 85.2 9.1 14.8 64.8 2.1 83.8
Means by period
Grants Operating costs Total spending





grants. In the next section, we examine these issues in more detail, trying to 







4. Model and results 
 
For any foundation, let S be spending, V be the value of net assets, t be a time 
index for years and P be one plus the inflation rate in year (t – 1). Then, the 








so that current year spending shall be set by the inflation-adjusted weighted 
sum of last year spending and of sustainable assets consumption in the long-
run. 
Regardless of foundations really following the Yale-Stanford model, 
this can be used, beyond its original normative purpose, as a positive tool for 
investigating how much importance they actually put to spending stabilization 
versus preserving the real value of assets and how sustainable their spending 
targets are in the long-run. Indeed, as smoothing decreases from one to zero, 
the rule represents approaches that vary between the polar cases of complete 
stabilization of spending, regardless of the value of assets, and of complete 
endowment conservation, regardless of the need to stabilize spending. Also, 
very high values of the target spending rate are likely to make an institution’s 
activity less sustainable over time, while very low ones may imply that assets 
will be hoarded and future beneficiaries preferred to current ones, thus 
violating intergenerational neutrality. 
To investigate the evolution of foundations spending policies, we have 
developed a simple linear regression model that allows us to estimate the 
average values of smoothing and target spending parameters of the Yale-
Stanford rule for the ten foundations in our sample. The derivation of the 
model is as follows. First, divide the Yale-Stanford equation above by net 
assets at time (t – 1): 
S(t)/P (t  1) = xS(t  1) + (1  x)zV (t  1)
<latexit sha1_base64="gICmOviegLO41R3xt/lEit2QKs8=">AAACEXicbZC7TgJBFIZn8YZ4Qy1tJhLNEgPuaqGNCYmNJQa5JEDI7DDAhNlLZs4acMMr2PgeVjYWGmNrZ2frkzgsFAr+ySRf/nNOzpzfCQRXYFlfRmJhcWl5JbmaWlvf2NxKb+9UlB9KysrUF76sOUQxwT1WBg6C1QLJiOsIVnX6l+N69ZZJxX3vBoYBa7qk6/EOpwS01UqbJROyx0UTcnYWX+ABLk3wCJs2zg2y+A5XYqeVzlh5KxaeB3sKmcJy8Fhixnexlf5stH0auswDKohSddsKoBkRCZwKNko1QsUCQvuky+oaPeIy1Yzii0b4QDtt3PGlfh7g2P09ERFXqaHr6E6XQE/N1sbmf7V6CJ3zZsS9IATm0cmiTigw+HgcD25zySiIoQZCJdd/xbRHJKGgQ0zpEOzZk+ehcpK3T/PWtU7jEE2URHtoH5nIRmeogK5QEZURRffoCb2gV+PBeDbejPdJa8KYzuyiPzI+fgDoHZpG</latexit>








Let y be the left-hand side term, that is spending scaled by net assets and 








and allow current spending to depend on last year returns, beyond what the 
rule already posits through the lag of V, so as to control for foundations 
deviating from it in ways consistent with the findings Brown and co-authors 
(2014). Now let i be an index that runs across foundations; the transformed 




 In our linear regression model for spending, we add a composite error 
term to this equation:  
 
 
which is meant to represent any factor that may determine current spending 
beyond what the Yale-Stanford rule and the possible dependence to past 
returns, account for. Here, we allow for both a foundation-specific component 
and an idiosyncratic component. We assume that the error components have 
zero mean, that they are not correlated one-another, serially or across 




for all i and t. These features imply that the composite error is such that: 
 
 
S(t)/[V (t  1)P (t  1)] = (1  x)z + S(t  1)/V (t  1)
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y(t) = (1  x)z + xs(t  1)
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 0 = (1  x)z,  1 = x
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y(i, t) =  0 +  1s(i, t  1) +  2r(i, t  1)
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✏(i, t) = µ(i) + ⌘(i, t)
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V ar[µ(i)] =  2µ , V ar[⌘(i, t)] =  
2
⌘
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E[✏(i, t)] = 0












so that errors are serially correlated for any foundation – but not across them. 
 From any consistent estimator of the linear regression model 
parameters we can consistently estimate the smoothing parameter x and the 




We can also compute approximate confidence intervals by the delta-method 
(Fox and Weisberg, 2019). Finally, we can check for foundations not deviating 
systematically from the spending rule by testing for . 
 Getting consistent estimators for our regression is complicated by the 
fact that lagged spending and net assets are determined by the foundation-
specific error component, which then is sequentially correlated with them. 
This is for two reasons: first, under the Yale-Stanford rule current spending 
depends on the first lag of spending; second, net assets depend on spending 




where R is the one plus the return on net assets3. Therefore, we cannot 




    
 
 
3 For more on this, please refer to Appendix 2. 
V ar[✏(i, t)] =  2µ +  
2
⌘
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E[✏(i, t), ✏(i, s)] =  2µ
<latexit sha1_base64="6caLvTVPpH5OdkYd3rRv0n7oN7E=">AAACGHicbZDLSgMxFIYz9VbrbdSlm2BRWih1pgi6EQoiuKxgLzAzlkyatqFJZkgyQil9DDe+ihsXirjtzrcxbWdRW38IfPnPOSTnD2NGlXacHyuztr6xuZXdzu3s7u0f2IdHDRUlEpM6jlgkWyFShFFB6ppqRlqxJIiHjDTDwe203nwmUtFIPOphTAKOeoJ2KUbaWG374s7zSawoi0SBlnSxBBeuUBUDeAN9RXscPVXaPk/adt4pOzPBVXBTyINUtbY98TsRTjgRGjOklOc6sQ5GSGqKGRnn/ESRGOEB6hHPoECcqGA0W2wMz4zTgd1ImiM0nLmLEyPElRry0HRypPtquTY1/6t5ie5eByMq4kQTgecPdRMGdQSnKcEOlQRrNjSAsKTmrxD3kURYmyxzJgR3eeVVaFTKruGHy3z1PI0jC07AKSgAF1yBKrgHNVAHGLyAN/ABPq1X6936sr7nrRkrnTkGf2RNfgHL255E</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6caLvTVPpH5OdkYd3rRv0n7oN7E=">AAACGHicbZDLSgMxFIYz9VbrbdSlm2BRWih1pgi6EQoiuKxgLzAzlkyatqFJZkgyQil9DDe+ihsXirjtzrcxbWdRW38IfPnPOSTnD2NGlXacHyuztr6xuZXdzu3s7u0f2IdHDRUlEpM6jlgkWyFShFFB6ppqRlqxJIiHjDTDwe203nwmUtFIPOphTAKOeoJ2KUbaWG374s7zSawoi0SBlnSxBBeuUBUDeAN9RXscPVXaPk/adt4pOzPBVXBTyINUtbY98TsRTjgRGjOklOc6sQ5GSGqKGRnn/ESRGOEB6hHPoECcqGA0W2wMz4zTgd1ImiM0nLmLEyPElRry0HRypPtquTY1/6t5ie5eByMq4kQTgecPdRMGdQSnKcEOlQRrNjSAsKTmrxD3kURYmyxzJgR3eeVVaFTKruGHy3z1PI0jC07AKSgAF1yBKrgHNVAHGLyAN/ABPq1X6936sr7nrRkrnTkGf2RNfgHL255E</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6caLvTVPpH5OdkYd3rRv0n7oN7E=">AAACGHicbZDLSgMxFIYz9VbrbdSlm2BRWih1pgi6EQoiuKxgLzAzlkyatqFJZkgyQil9DDe+ihsXirjtzrcxbWdRW38IfPnPOSTnD2NGlXacHyuztr6xuZXdzu3s7u0f2IdHDRUlEpM6jlgkWyFShFFB6ppqRlqxJIiHjDTDwe203nwmUtFIPOphTAKOeoJ2KUbaWG374s7zSawoi0SBlnSxBBeuUBUDeAN9RXscPVXaPk/adt4pOzPBVXBTyINUtbY98TsRTjgRGjOklOc6sQ5GSGqKGRnn/ESRGOEB6hHPoECcqGA0W2wMz4zTgd1ImiM0nLmLEyPElRry0HRypPtquTY1/6t5ie5eByMq4kQTgecPdRMGdQSnKcEOlQRrNjSAsKTmrxD3kURYmyxzJgR3eeVVaFTKruGHy3z1PI0jC07AKSgAF1yBKrgHNVAHGLyAN/ABPq1X6936sr7nrRkrnTkGf2RNfgHL255E</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ck8pdC+ekZH4nUmSP+ZG7r8lEyk=">AAAB2XicbZDNSgMxFIXv1L86Vq1rN8EiuCozbnQpuHFZwbZCO5RM5k4bmskMyR2hDH0BF25EfC93vo3pz0JbDwQ+zknIvSculLQUBN9ebWd3b/+gfugfNfzjk9Nmo2fz0gjsilzl5jnmFpXU2CVJCp8LgzyLFfbj6f0i77+gsTLXTzQrMMr4WMtUCk7O6oyaraAdLMW2IVxDC9YaNb+GSS7KDDUJxa0dhEFBUcUNSaFw7g9LiwUXUz7GgUPNM7RRtRxzzi6dk7A0N+5oYkv394uKZ9bOstjdzDhN7Ga2MP/LBiWlt1EldVESarH6KC0Vo5wtdmaJNChIzRxwYaSblYkJN1yQa8Z3HYSbG29D77odOn4MoA7ncAFXEMIN3MEDdKALAhJ4hXdv4r15H6uuat66tDP4I+/zBzjGijg=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="A2fdA4W8vX9duRii6I03M+6HHug=">AAACDXicbZDLSgMxGIX/qbdaq45u3QSL0EKpM93oRhBEcFnBXqAzlkyatqFJZkgyQil9DDe+ihsXirh159uYXha19UDgyzkJyX+ihDNtPO/HyWxsbm3vZHdze/n9g0P3KN/QcaoIrZOYx6oVYU05k7RumOG0lSiKRcRpMxreTPPmE1WaxfLBjBIaCtyXrMcINtbquOe37YAmmvFYFlnZlMpoaYt0KURXKNCsL/BjtROItOMWvIo3E1oHfwEFWKjWcb+DbkxSQaUhHGvd9r3EhGOsDCOcTnJBqmmCyRD3aduixILqcDwbbILOrNNFvVjZJQ2aucs3xlhoPRKRPSmwGejVbGr+l7VT07sMx0wmqaGSzB/qpRyZGE1bQl2mKDF8ZAETxexfERlghYmxXeZsCf7qyOvQqFZ8y/ceZOEETqEIPlzANdxBDepA4Ble4R0+nBfnzfmc15VxFr0dwx85X78I9Zzd</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="A2fdA4W8vX9duRii6I03M+6HHug=">AAACDXicbZDLSgMxGIX/qbdaq45u3QSL0EKpM93oRhBEcFnBXqAzlkyatqFJZkgyQil9DDe+ihsXirh159uYXha19UDgyzkJyX+ihDNtPO/HyWxsbm3vZHdze/n9g0P3KN/QcaoIrZOYx6oVYU05k7RumOG0lSiKRcRpMxreTPPmE1WaxfLBjBIaCtyXrMcINtbquOe37YAmmvFYFlnZlMpoaYt0KURXKNCsL/BjtROItOMWvIo3E1oHfwEFWKjWcb+DbkxSQaUhHGvd9r3EhGOsDCOcTnJBqmmCyRD3aduixILqcDwbbILOrNNFvVjZJQ2aucs3xlhoPRKRPSmwGejVbGr+l7VT07sMx0wmqaGSzB/qpRyZGE1bQl2mKDF8ZAETxexfERlghYmxXeZsCf7qyOvQqFZ8y/ceZOEETqEIPlzANdxBDepA4Ble4R0+nBfnzfmc15VxFr0dwx85X78I9Zzd</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Z6TNW0XUvx5mItFVGI90S2MPdvo=">AAACGHicbZDLSgMxFIYzXmu9jbp0EyxKC6XOdKMboSCCywr2AjPjkEnTNjTJDElGKKWP4cZXceNCEbfd+Tam7Sxq6w+BL/85h+T8UcKo0o7zY62tb2xubed28rt7+weH9tFxU8WpxKSBYxbLdoQUYVSQhqaakXYiCeIRI61ocDutt56JVDQWj3qYkICjnqBdipE2Vmhf3nk+SRRlsSjSsi6V4cIVqlIAb6CvaI+jp2ro8zS0C07FmQmugptBAWSqh/bE78Q45URozJBSnuskOhghqSlmZJz3U0UShAeoRzyDAnGigtFssTE8N04HdmNpjtBw5i5OjBBXasgj08mR7qvl2tT8r+alunsdjKhIUk0Enj/UTRnUMZymBDtUEqzZ0ADCkpq/QtxHEmFtssybENzllVehWa24hh+cQu0iiyMHTsEZKAIXXIEauAd10AAYvIA38AE+rVfr3fqyvueta1Y2cwL+yJr8AsqbnkA=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6caLvTVPpH5OdkYd3rRv0n7oN7E=">AAACGHicbZDLSgMxFIYz9VbrbdSlm2BRWih1pgi6EQoiuKxgLzAzlkyatqFJZkgyQil9DDe+ihsXirjtzrcxbWdRW38IfPnPOSTnD2NGlXacHyuztr6xuZXdzu3s7u0f2IdHDRUlEpM6jlgkWyFShFFB6ppqRlqxJIiHjDTDwe203nwmUtFIPOphTAKOeoJ2KUbaWG374s7zSawoi0SBlnSxBBeuUBUDeAN9RXscPVXaPk/adt4pOzPBVXBTyINUtbY98TsRTjgRGjOklOc6sQ5GSGqKGRnn/ESRGOEB6hHPoECcqGA0W2wMz4zTgd1ImiM0nLmLEyPElRry0HRypPtquTY1/6t5ie5eByMq4kQTgecPdRMGdQSnKcEOlQRrNjSAsKTmrxD3kURYmyxzJgR3eeVVaFTKruGHy3z1PI0jC07AKSgAF1yBKrgHNVAHGLyAN/ABPq1X6936sr7nrRkrnTkGf2RNfgHL255E</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6caLvTVPpH5OdkYd3rRv0n7oN7E=">AAACGHicbZDLSgMxFIYz9VbrbdSlm2BRWih1pgi6EQoiuKxgLzAzlkyatqFJZkgyQil9DDe+ihsXirjtzrcxbWdRW38IfPnPOSTnD2NGlXacHyuztr6xuZXdzu3s7u0f2IdHDRUlEpM6jlgkWyFShFFB6ppqRlqxJIiHjDTDwe203nwmUtFIPOphTAKOeoJ2KUbaWG374s7zSawoi0SBlnSxBBeuUBUDeAN9RXscPVXaPk/adt4pOzPBVXBTyINUtbY98TsRTjgRGjOklOc6sQ5GSGqKGRnn/ESRGOEB6hHPoECcqGA0W2wMz4zTgd1ImiM0nLmLEyPElRry0HRypPtquTY1/6t5ie5eByMq4kQTgecPdRMGdQSnKcEOlQRrNjSAsKTmrxD3kURYmyxzJgR3eeVVaFTKruGHy3z1PI0jC07AKSgAF1yBKrgHNVAHGLyAN/ABPq1X6936sr7nrRkrnTkGf2RNfgHL255E</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6caLvTVPpH5OdkYd3rRv0n7oN7E=">AAACGHicbZDLSgMxFIYz9VbrbdSlm2BRWih1pgi6EQoiuKxgLzAzlkyatqFJZkgyQil9DDe+ihsXirjtzrcxbWdRW38IfPnPOSTnD2NGlXacHyuztr6xuZXdzu3s7u0f2IdHDRUlEpM6jlgkWyFShFFB6ppqRlqxJIiHjDTDwe203nwmUtFIPOphTAKOeoJ2KUbaWG374s7zSawoi0SBlnSxBBeuUBUDeAN9RXscPVXaPk/adt4pOzPBVXBTyINUtbY98TsRTjgRGjOklOc6sQ5GSGqKGRnn/ESRGOEB6hHPoECcqGA0W2wMz4zTgd1ImiM0nLmLEyPElRry0HRypPtquTY1/6t5ie5eByMq4kQTgecPdRMGdQSnKcEOlQRrNjSAsKTmrxD3kURYmyxzJgR3eeVVaFTKruGHy3z1PI0jC07AKSgAF1yBKrgHNVAHGLyAN/ABPq1X6936sr7nrRkrnTkGf2RNfgHL255E</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6caLvTVPpH5OdkYd3rRv0n7oN7E=">AAACGHicbZDLSgMxFIYz9VbrbdSlm2BRWih1pgi6EQoiuKxgLzAzlkyatqFJZkgyQil9DDe+ihsXirjtzrcxbWdRW38IfPnPOSTnD2NGlXacHyuztr6xuZXdzu3s7u0f2IdHDRUlEpM6jlgkWyFShFFB6ppqRlqxJIiHjDTDwe203nwmUtFIPOphTAKOeoJ2KUbaWG374s7zSawoi0SBlnSxBBeuUBUDeAN9RXscPVXaPk/adt4pOzPBVXBTyINUtbY98TsRTjgRGjOklOc6sQ5GSGqKGRnn/ESRGOEB6hHPoECcqGA0W2wMz4zTgd1ImiM0nLmLEyPElRry0HRypPtquTY1/6t5ie5eByMq4kQTgecPdRMGdQSnKcEOlQRrNjSAsKTmrxD3kURYmyxzJgR3eeVVaFTKruGHy3z1PI0jC07AKSgAF1yBKrgHNVAHGLyAN/ABPq1X6936sr7nrRkrnTkGf2RNfgHL255E</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6caLvTVPpH5OdkYd3rRv0n7oN7E=">AAACGHicbZDLSgMxFIYz9VbrbdSlm2BRWih1pgi6EQoiuKxgLzAzlkyatqFJZkgyQil9DDe+ihsXirjtzrcxbWdRW38IfPnPOSTnD2NGlXacHyuztr6xuZXdzu3s7u0f2IdHDRUlEpM6jlgkWyFShFFB6ppqRlqxJIiHjDTDwe203nwmUtFIPOphTAKOeoJ2KUbaWG374s7zSawoi0SBlnSxBBeuUBUDeAN9RXscPVXaPk/adt4pOzPBVXBTyINUtbY98TsRTjgRGjOklOc6sQ5GSGqKGRnn/ESRGOEB6hHPoECcqGA0W2wMz4zTgd1ImiM0nLmLEyPElRry0HRypPtquTY1/6t5ie5eByMq4kQTgecPdRMGdQSnKcEOlQRrNjSAsKTmrxD3kURYmyxzJgR3eeVVaFTKruGHy3z1PI0jC07AKSgAF1yBKrgHNVAHGLyAN/ABPq1X6936sr7nrRkrnTkGf2RNfgHL255E</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6caLvTVPpH5OdkYd3rRv0n7oN7E=">AAACGHicbZDLSgMxFIYz9VbrbdSlm2BRWih1pgi6EQoiuKxgLzAzlkyatqFJZkgyQil9DDe+ihsXirjtzrcxbWdRW38IfPnPOSTnD2NGlXacHyuztr6xuZXdzu3s7u0f2IdHDRUlEpM6jlgkWyFShFFB6ppqRlqxJIiHjDTDwe203nwmUtFIPOphTAKOeoJ2KUbaWG374s7zSawoi0SBlnSxBBeuUBUDeAN9RXscPVXaPk/adt4pOzPBVXBTyINUtbY98TsRTjgRGjOklOc6sQ5GSGqKGRnn/ESRGOEB6hHPoECcqGA0W2wMz4zTgd1ImiM0nLmLEyPElRry0HRypPtquTY1/6t5ie5eByMq4kQTgecPdRMGdQSnKcEOlQRrNjSAsKTmrxD3kURYmyxzJgR3eeVVaFTKruGHy3z1PI0jC07AKSgAF1yBKrgHNVAHGLyAN/ABPq1X6936sr7nrRkrnTkGf2RNfgHL255E</latexit>
x =  1, z =
 0
1   1
<latexit sha1_base64="YuiECeffKRxa4NP99DqYlX8L5Dg=">AAACH3icbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdelmsCgutCQi6kYouHFZwT6gCWEymbRDJ5M4MxFryJ+48VfcuFBE3PVvnLQVtPXAwOGcc7lzj58wKpVlDY25+YXFpeXSSnl1bX1j09zabso4FZg0cMxi0faRJIxy0lBUMdJOBEGRz0jL718VfuueCEljfqsGCXEj1OU0pBgpLXnm2QO8hI5PFPJsmB3BHDp3KQrgYyGHAuFsbFp5ZsPjn2TumRWrao0AZ4k9IRUwQd0zv5wgxmlEuMIMSdmxrUS5GRKKYkbyspNKkiDcR13S0ZSjiEg3G92Xw32tBDCMhX5cwZH6eyJDkZSDyNfJCKmenPYK8T+vk6rwws0oT1JFOB4vClMGVQyLsmBABcGKDTRBWFD9V4h7SLeidKVlXYI9ffIsaZ5Ubc1vTiu1g0kdJbAL9sAhsME5qIFrUAcNgMETeAFv4N14Nl6ND+NzHJ0zJjM74A+M4TfyLaBf</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="YuiECeffKRxa4NP99DqYlX8L5Dg=">AAACH3icbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdelmsCgutCQi6kYouHFZwT6gCWEymbRDJ5M4MxFryJ+48VfcuFBE3PVvnLQVtPXAwOGcc7lzj58wKpVlDY25+YXFpeXSSnl1bX1j09zabso4FZg0cMxi0faRJIxy0lBUMdJOBEGRz0jL718VfuueCEljfqsGCXEj1OU0pBgpLXnm2QO8hI5PFPJsmB3BHDp3KQrgYyGHAuFsbFp5ZsPjn2TumRWrao0AZ4k9IRUwQd0zv5wgxmlEuMIMSdmxrUS5GRKKYkbyspNKkiDcR13S0ZSjiEg3G92Xw32tBDCMhX5cwZH6eyJDkZSDyNfJCKmenPYK8T+vk6rwws0oT1JFOB4vClMGVQyLsmBABcGKDTRBWFD9V4h7SLeidKVlXYI9ffIsaZ5Ubc1vTiu1g0kdJbAL9sAhsME5qIFrUAcNgMETeAFv4N14Nl6ND+NzHJ0zJjM74A+M4TfyLaBf</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="YuiECeffKRxa4NP99DqYlX8L5Dg=">AAACH3icbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdelmsCgutCQi6kYouHFZwT6gCWEymbRDJ5M4MxFryJ+48VfcuFBE3PVvnLQVtPXAwOGcc7lzj58wKpVlDY25+YXFpeXSSnl1bX1j09zabso4FZg0cMxi0faRJIxy0lBUMdJOBEGRz0jL718VfuueCEljfqsGCXEj1OU0pBgpLXnm2QO8hI5PFPJsmB3BHDp3KQrgYyGHAuFsbFp5ZsPjn2TumRWrao0AZ4k9IRUwQd0zv5wgxmlEuMIMSdmxrUS5GRKKYkbyspNKkiDcR13S0ZSjiEg3G92Xw32tBDCMhX5cwZH6eyJDkZSDyNfJCKmenPYK8T+vk6rwws0oT1JFOB4vClMGVQyLsmBABcGKDTRBWFD9V4h7SLeidKVlXYI9ffIsaZ5Ubc1vTiu1g0kdJbAL9sAhsME5qIFrUAcNgMETeAFv4N14Nl6ND+NzHJ0zJjM74A+M4TfyLaBf</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="YuiECeffKRxa4NP99DqYlX8L5Dg=">AAACH3icbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdelmsCgutCQi6kYouHFZwT6gCWEymbRDJ5M4MxFryJ+48VfcuFBE3PVvnLQVtPXAwOGcc7lzj58wKpVlDY25+YXFpeXSSnl1bX1j09zabso4FZg0cMxi0faRJIxy0lBUMdJOBEGRz0jL718VfuueCEljfqsGCXEj1OU0pBgpLXnm2QO8hI5PFPJsmB3BHDp3KQrgYyGHAuFsbFp5ZsPjn2TumRWrao0AZ4k9IRUwQd0zv5wgxmlEuMIMSdmxrUS5GRKKYkbyspNKkiDcR13S0ZSjiEg3G92Xw32tBDCMhX5cwZH6eyJDkZSDyNfJCKmenPYK8T+vk6rwws0oT1JFOB4vClMGVQyLsmBABcGKDTRBWFD9V4h7SLeidKVlXYI9ffIsaZ5Ubc1vTiu1g0kdJbAL9sAhsME5qIFrUAcNgMETeAFv4N14Nl6ND+NzHJ0zJjM74A+M4TfyLaBf</latexit>
 2 = 0
<latexit sha1_base64="jghbm2LFKSX2gcJblKrGDPPAWXc=">AAAB8nicbZBNS8NAEIY3ftb6VfXoZbEonkpSBL0IBS8eK9gPSEPZbCft0s0m7E6EEvozvHhQxKu/xpv/xm2bg7a+sPDwzgw784apFAZd99tZW9/Y3Nou7ZR39/YPDitHx22TZJpDiycy0d2QGZBCQQsFSuimGlgcSuiE47tZvfME2ohEPeIkhSBmQyUiwRlay++FgKxfp7fU7Veqbs2di66CV0CVFGr2K1+9QcKzGBRyyYzxPTfFIGcaBZcwLfcyAynjYzYE36JiMZggn688pefWGdAo0fYppHP390TOYmMmcWg7Y4Yjs1ybmf/V/AyjmyAXKs0QFF98FGWSYkJn99OB0MBRTiwwroXdlfIR04yjTalsQ/CWT16Fdr3mWX64qjYuijhK5JSckUvikWvSIPekSVqEk4Q8k1fy5qDz4rw7H4vWNaeYOSF/5Hz+AIqkkAI=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jghbm2LFKSX2gcJblKrGDPPAWXc=">AAAB8nicbZBNS8NAEIY3ftb6VfXoZbEonkpSBL0IBS8eK9gPSEPZbCft0s0m7E6EEvozvHhQxKu/xpv/xm2bg7a+sPDwzgw784apFAZd99tZW9/Y3Nou7ZR39/YPDitHx22TZJpDiycy0d2QGZBCQQsFSuimGlgcSuiE47tZvfME2ohEPeIkhSBmQyUiwRlay++FgKxfp7fU7Veqbs2di66CV0CVFGr2K1+9QcKzGBRyyYzxPTfFIGcaBZcwLfcyAynjYzYE36JiMZggn688pefWGdAo0fYppHP390TOYmMmcWg7Y4Yjs1ybmf/V/AyjmyAXKs0QFF98FGWSYkJn99OB0MBRTiwwroXdlfIR04yjTalsQ/CWT16Fdr3mWX64qjYuijhK5JSckUvikWvSIPekSVqEk4Q8k1fy5qDz4rw7H4vWNaeYOSF/5Hz+AIqkkAI=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jghbm2LFKSX2gcJblKrGDPPAWXc=">AAAB8nicbZBNS8NAEIY3ftb6VfXoZbEonkpSBL0IBS8eK9gPSEPZbCft0s0m7E6EEvozvHhQxKu/xpv/xm2bg7a+sPDwzgw784apFAZd99tZW9/Y3Nou7ZR39/YPDitHx22TZJpDiycy0d2QGZBCQQsFSuimGlgcSuiE47tZvfME2ohEPeIkhSBmQyUiwRlay++FgKxfp7fU7Veqbs2di66CV0CVFGr2K1+9QcKzGBRyyYzxPTfFIGcaBZcwLfcyAynjYzYE36JiMZggn688pefWGdAo0fYppHP390TOYmMmcWg7Y4Yjs1ybmf/V/AyjmyAXKs0QFF98FGWSYkJn99OB0MBRTiwwroXdlfIR04yjTalsQ/CWT16Fdr3mWX64qjYuijhK5JSckUvikWvSIPekSVqEk4Q8k1fy5qDz4rw7H4vWNaeYOSF/5Hz+AIqkkAI=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jghbm2LFKSX2gcJblKrGDPPAWXc=">AAAB8nicbZBNS8NAEIY3ftb6VfXoZbEonkpSBL0IBS8eK9gPSEPZbCft0s0m7E6EEvozvHhQxKu/xpv/xm2bg7a+sPDwzgw784apFAZd99tZW9/Y3Nou7ZR39/YPDitHx22TZJpDiycy0d2QGZBCQQsFSuimGlgcSuiE47tZvfME2ohEPeIkhSBmQyUiwRlay++FgKxfp7fU7Veqbs2di66CV0CVFGr2K1+9QcKzGBRyyYzxPTfFIGcaBZcwLfcyAynjYzYE36JiMZggn688pefWGdAo0fYppHP390TOYmMmcWg7Y4Yjs1ybmf/V/AyjmyAXKs0QFF98FGWSYkJn99OB0MBRTiwwroXdlfIR04yjTalsQ/CWT16Fdr3mWX64qjYuijhK5JSckUvikWvSIPekSVqEk4Q8k1fy5qDz4rw7H4vWNaeYOSF/5Hz+AIqkkAI=</latexit>
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E[µ(i)|s(i, t  1), r(i, t  1)] 6= 0 =) E[✏(i, t)|s(i, t  1), r(i, t  1)] 6= 0





This situation is basically the same that has been extensively explored 
in the literature about inference for dynamic models with panel data, such as 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981), Arellano and Bond (1991), Holtz-Eakin (1991). 





by the (Generalized) Method of Moments, forming moment conditions from 
the sequential uncorrelation of the first differences of error terms with past 




for k > 2, and similarly for r and Dr. 
However, this approach has some serious drawbacks. First, because 
of the form of our model, estimating the intercept of the regression equation 
is crucial for identifying the target spending-rate parameter z, but the intercept 
is wiped-out when we take the first-difference of the regression equation. 
Second, consistency of moment estimators in dynamic models is achieved as 
the cross-sectional dimension of the panel sample grows to infinity. This is 
problematic in our case, since our sample consists of just ten foundations; 
furthermore, the number of foundations in the sample cannot conceptually be 
thought as  potentially growing very large, because the population of Italian 
banking foundations itself is limited to 88 institutions which, by the way, have 
always been the same since they were established in 19904. Finally, the large-
sample properties of such estimators are well known to be quite poor in 
moderate samples, in terms of bias, efficiency and convergence of sampling 
distributions when past lags of the endogenous variable do not correlate 
much with its current first-difference or when the variance of the individual 
 
4 For a similar argument, the time-series process of foundations spending history is 
limited to 29 years to date, which also conceptually hinders us using macro-
econometric methods for panel data where inference is based on the time dimension 
extending for a long time in the past, such as those discussed in Pesaran and co-
authors (1996, 1999). 
 y(i, t) =  1 s(i, t  1) +  2 r(i, t  1) + ✏(i, t)
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E[s(i, t  k) ✏(i, t)] = 0






error component is large, to the point that least-squares based estimators, 
although biased for any sample size, may be preferred (Blundell and co-
authors, 2002). In our model, this means that if foundations do not smooth-
out spending a lot, i.e. x is close to zero, or if foundation-specific random 
effect are important, then inference based on the first-difference regression 
equation is likely to be unreliable. 
Notice that if foundation-specific random effects are not important and 
the idiosyncratic error component is not serially correlated, then the least 
squares estimator of the transformed spending equation is consistent along 
both the cross-sectional the time-series dimensions, and that under the 
constant variance and cross-uncorrelation assumptions, it is efficient. 
Therefore, under these conditions, we will prefer least squares than 
Generalized Method of Moments, because the latter is less efficient and may 
have large bias in our sample; then, deciding whether foundation-specific 
effects are to be taken care of or not makes a difference to our estimation 
strategy. We do this by the Holtz-Eakin (1988) testing procedure, which is 
based on the results of two Generalized Method of Moments estimators of 











Under the null hypothesis, both conditions are valid, while under the 
alternative only the first is. Then, testing for foundation-specific effects 
reduces to testing the overidentifying restrictions of the estimator which uses 
both condition versus the estimator which uses only the first. 
We make all analyses on our panel data-set of N = 10 foundations over 
T = 11 years – from 2005 to 2016, as 2004 is lost because of the lagged 
explanatory variables. As we are interested in investigating whether the 
1. E[s(i, t  k) ✏(i, t)] = 0, for k > 2
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2. E[s(i, t  k)✏(i, t)] = 0, for k > 1
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H0: µ(i) = 0 for all i
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spending decisions of foundations changed over time, we estimate several 
regression equations, where we either restrict parameters to be the same in 
all years, or we allow them to change over certain periods. The more general 
version maintains that the average smoothing and target spending-rate could 
have changed from 2005-08, before the effects of the financial crises 
materialized, to the critical 2009-12 period and over the aftermaths of the 
crises, beyond 2012. A second version of the equations pools the last two 
periods together, so that parameters are allowed to be different over the 2005-
08 and 2009-16 periods only. For all three versions, we either control for 
lagged returns or we do not. Therefore, we estimate six different models, 
where current (inflation adjusted) spending depends on past spending, target 
spending-rate and: (1) past returns, (2) past returns and three periods, (3) 
nothing else, (4) three periods, (5) past returns and two periods and (6) two 
periods. 
 We run the Holtz-Eakin (1988) test for models 1 and 2, which are the 
more general, using a maximum of five lags to form the moment conditions. 
In both instances, we confidently do not reject the null hypothesis that 
foundation-specific effects do not matter. The value of the test for the pooled 
model is 0.504 and its p-value equals 0.918; for the model where parameters 
are allowed to change over three periods, the outcomes are 4.567 and 0.713. 
 Having not rejected that foundation-specific random effects are not 
significant for the dynamics of spending, we assume that errors are 
idiosyncratic and we estimate the parameters of the Yale-Stanford equation 
by least-squares. This is consistent and efficient under the assumptions that 
errors have are not serially- or cross-correlated and have constant variance 
over time and across foundations5. In table 4 we provide the results of our 
analyses for the first two specifications explained above. We show estimates 
and confidence intervals of the spending policy equation parameters where 
we allow them to change over the 2005-08, 2009-12 and 2013-16, and we 
control for lagged returns. Diagnostic tests for serial correlation, non-constant 
variance and contemporaneous correlation of the errors across foundations 
are shown at the bottom of the table; in the last line shows an F-test of the 
 
5 We carried out all analyses in the R environment (R Core Team, 2019). For panel 
data models we used the plm package (Croissant and Millo, 2008; Millo, 2017). plm 
test statistics methods have dependencies to the car package (Fox and Weisberg, 





hypothesis that policy parameters do not change over time by testing the 
restrictions on the by-periods equation that transform it in the pooled model. 
 
Table 4 
Estimates of spending policy parameters by three periods controlling for returns 
 
Note: Least squares estimates of spending policy parameters with 90 percent confidence 
intervals. The delta-method is used for computing confidence (Fox and Weisberg, 2019). Serial 
correlation is tested by the Durbin-Watson statistic, following Wooldridge (2002); 
Heteroscedasticity test is Breusch and Pagan’s (1979); cross-dependency is tested according 
to Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange-multiplier approach. For all three tests, errors are not 
correlated and have constant variance under the null hypothesis, so rejection casts doubt on 
the assumptions of the model which justify using least squares. The hypothesis that parameters 
are constant over the 2005-16 period is tested by the Wald procedure (Fox and Weisberg, 
2019). 
 
 The pooled estimates of the smoothing and target-spending are 0.21 
and 2.64 percent; this is close to the average spending rate on net assets for 
all years shown in table 3 and has a tight confidence interval – 2.39 to 2.90 
percent. According to these results, foundations seem not to have smoothed 
spending a lot: besides the low value of the point estimate, the confidence 
interval extends very close to zero on the lower side; however, the higher side 
is about 0.39, so our estimate is not very precise. Lagged return does not have 
a significant partial effect on spending, neither by the magnitude of the 
estimated parameter, nor from the statistical point of view, because its 
confidence interval is very tight about zero. Our estimates from the by-periods 
equation provide evidence that target spending did not change much over 
time, since point estimates are in the 2.72 to 2.88 percent range. Here, 
Estimate 5% 95% Estimate 5% 95%
Smoothing 0.207 0.024 0.389 0.038 -0.182 0.257
Target return 2.642 2.387 2.896 2.867 2.473 3.261
Lag of return -0.004 -0.010 0.002 -0.005 -0.011 0.001
Smoothing 2009-12 0.222 0.008 0.435
Smoothing 2013-16 0.487 0.223 0.750
Target return 2009-12 2.718 2.251 3.186
Target return 2013-16 2.878 2.129 3.628
Test Statistic P-value Model Statistic P-value Model
Serial correlation 2.191 0.845 N = 10 2.180 0.796 N = 10
Heteroscedasticity 0.675 0.714 T = 11 8.627 0.196 T = 11
Cross-dependency 59.693 0.070 NT = 110 65.503 0.036 NT = 110
 Model significance 3.803 0.025 DoF = 2 2.558 0.024 DoF = 6
Pooled vs. By period Statisitic = 1.874 P-value = 0.121 DoF = 4
Parameters





confidence intervals are less tight than in the pooled equation, their width 
varying from about 0.8 to 1.5 percent; also, the three intervals overlap to a 
large extent, so that we cannot claim that target spending changed over time 
beyond what sampling error can justify. This is not so for smoothing, which is 
close to zero from 2005 to 2008 and gradually grows to 0.49 over the 2013-
16 period; also, confidence intervals, although overlapping to some extent, 
gradually shift towards larger values. As for the pooled equation, there seem 
to be not any partial dependence of spending on lagged returns. 
 Diagnostic tests do not signal any serial correlation or 
heteroscedasticity in the errors, but we cannot reject their contemporaneous 
cross-correlation. Then, it is possible that least squares are not fully efficient, 
which may motivate the low precision of the smoothing estimator. This may 
also explain why the F-test of the hypothesis that policy parameters do not 
change over time is quite small and its p-value is 0.121, so that the claim that 
smoothing differs by periods is not very strong6. 
 The evidence that we gather from estimating specifications (3) to (6) 
are not significantly different from the above and are reported in Appendix 3. 
 Taking care of limitations of our estimators, we nevertheless believe 
that our estimates provide some useful insights about foundations’ spending 
policies, on how they reacted to the financial crises and on their long-term 
sustainability. First, on average it seems that foundations did not significantly 
change their attitude about long-term consumption of assets during or after 
the financial crises. This is the strongest claim we can make from the analyses 
above, and also a remarkable one because, regarding this aspect, spending 
policies of foundations were stable in times of financial turmoil. Furthermore, 
the estimated value of target spending-rates looks sensible, at least with 
 
6 One may argue that we should have allowed smoothing to change but target 
spending to be constant over periods. This solution is, however, troublesome 
because even if we forced the intercept of the ‘by period’ equation to be the same for 
all periods, the estimate of target spending could nevertheless change, as it depends 
on the smoothing parameter. Furthermore, doing so would violate the principle of 
marginality, which states that, in general, it is wrong to estimate main effects of 
explanatory variables where the variables interact but delete main effects that are 
marginal to them (Nelder, 1977). Nevertheless, when we have tried to impose the 
restriction that the intercept of the equation is the same over periods, any significant 
difference both in the estimates of parameters, in the F-Test for poolability and in the 
outcome of the cross-dependency test has not emerged. We also considered adding 
a time-specific random effect to our model, but this has made not any significant 
difference too. While the results of these trials are not reported here, they are available 





respect to the investment opportunities which has unfolded from 2008 
onwards, when interest rates were low, risky-asset returns quite uncertain and 
inflation moderate. We believe that the average target spending rates of about 
3 percent which we estimate is consistent with long-term sustainability as it 
is consistent with sensible expectations of long-run expected returns, 
 Second, it seems that foundations did not link current spending to past 
spending very much, even though we have some evidence that smoothing 
gradually increased on average after 2008. Indeed, our point estimates are in 
the zero to 0.5 percent range, far below the 0.7 to 0.8 values which belong to 
Yale endowment, as well as to several other university funds in the United 
States. The main implication of this finding is that foundations mainly 
transferred temporary shocks that hit net assets to current spending and, 
because operating costs were quite rigid, in particular to current grants. We 
believe that this may explain the sharp decline of foundations granting activity 
from 2009 to 2012. Also, the increase of smoothing after 2012 may explain 
why spending stayed low and did not recover by 2016. 
 Finally, the lack of significance of lagged returns in both equations 
suggest that foundations did not systematically set spending according to the 
performance of their investments beyond what was its impact on net assets. 
Therefore, we have not any significant evidence of foundations systematically 
‘hoarding’ their wealth by acting asymmetrically to shocks that hit their assets, 
contrary to what Brown and co-authors (2014) have found for university 
endowments in the United States. However, it shall be pointed out that 
because spending policies seem to have veered towards smoothing, the joint 
effect of grant reduction during the crises and its persistence afterwards 
seems to have set a quite conservative stance in foundation spending policies 
which is likely to trade-off the welfare of their current beneficiaries for that of 





4. Concluding remarks 
 
Banking foundations are important institutional investors and non-profit 
operators on the national scene. They derive the resources for their activities 
from investing their wealth on the financial markets and have a long-term 
mission. Therefore, the financial management of foundations is characterized 
by two antithetical objectives: the maintenance of adequate levels of spending 
in the short term and the conservation of net assets over the long term. The 
tension between these goals has emerged strongly during the financial crisis. 
We estimate the smoothing and target spending rate parameters that 
describe the spending decisions of ten major Italian banking foundations 
between 2005 and 2016 by a linear regression model based on the Yale-
Stanford rule and using net assets and returns at current market values. 
Our analysis shows that foundations spending targets were mainly set 
with respect to net assets values, overshadowing the stabilization of spending 
in the short-term. The target rate of consumption of net assets was stable at 
about three percent over time, a level which is consistent with sustainable 
spending in the long-term. However, we find some evidence that, in the 
aftermath of the financial crises, foundations gradually started to smooth 
spending, albeit to a limited extent compared to what is common for university 
endowments in the United States.   
Overall, spending policies seemed to be quite stable from 2005 to 
2016, possibly except for a change towards linking current spending to past 
spending and not principally to the past value of net assets. Because the 
financial crises greatly reduced the real value of foundations’ net assets, an 
increase in smoothing since 2013 may explain why spending remained low 
until 2016 if compared to the pre-crises’ levels. We think that, if this may be 
justified on the grounds of a prudent financial management over the short-
term, keeping this stance in the long-term can reduce the grant making 
activity of foundations excessively and conflict with the principle of 
intergenerational neutrality.  
We believe that our research, which is the first to systematically tackle 
the topic of the spending policy of Italian banking foundation, has interesting 





greater number of foundations, possibly smaller than those considered here, 
can improve the understanding of the phenomenon and reveal possible 
differences in spending policies between small and big foundations. Indeed, 
as the size of foundations increase, they benefit from economies of scale both 
in operating expenses and in the management of their assets; also, big 
foundations often have professional skills and specialized investment offices 
to manage their portfolios, while small foundations do not and must outsource 
this activity to external advisors who may not always provide services suited 
to their specific needs.    
Second, we deem it will be interesting to extend the analysis to the 
management of foundations investment portfolios, an aspect that is 
complementary to spending policy decisions. Indeed, target spending-rates 
and smoothing should depend on the expected return and risk profile of 
foundations investments; for example, institutions whose portfolios’ returns 
are stable in the short-run can afford to smooth spending to a larger extent 
than those whose returns are volatile (Swensen, 2009). 
Finally, as we acknowledge that some of our conclusion have limited 
scope because of the lack of precision of some of our estimates, a further 
effort shall be made in trying to improve them. We think of two ways for doing 
so. First, contemporaneous cross-correlation of regression errors which 
emerged from our analyses, shall be modelled explicitly: one way to di this is 
by seemingly-unrelated regression equations models (Zellner, 1968). Second, 
the estimation of spending policy parameters can be done by imposing prior 
constraints on their admissible value, as we know that smoothing must be in 
the zero to one range and that the target spending-rate must be positive and 
is likely not to exceed by much a sensible expectation of long-term real 
returns, say five percent. While this prior information cannot be handled 
correctly with classical econometric methods, it surely is with Bayesian ones, 
– at the price of a heavier computational cost (Gelman and co-authors, 2013). 
In this direction, we think that hierarchical models for panel data, such as 
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Appendix 1 – Calculation of total returns and spending 
The methodology for calculating total returns on financial assets at market 
values is as follows: 
1. We calculate the change of the market value of financial assets between 
the beginning and end of each fiscal year; 
2. This change reflects both the change in market value of incumbent 
investments and the change in the holdings of financial assets during the fiscal 
year, so that we subtract the variation of assets at book values to the result of 
point 1; 
3. Since the change in assets at book values already considers some 
revaluations made during the period, the latter must be added to the result of 
Point 2 (specifically: ‘Risultato delle gestioni patrimoniali individuali’, 
‘Rivalutazione (svalutazione) netta di strumenti finanziari non immobilizzati’, 
‘Rivalutazione (svalutazione) netta di immobilizzazioni finanziarie’ and ‘Plus / 
minusvalenze da alienazione di immobilizzazioni finanziarie’); 
4. Finally, the result of Point 3 is added to current income deriving from 
dividends and interests, realized gains and losses deriving from the trading in 
non-fixed financial assets. 
Tax returns on dividends, interest expense and other financial charges, 
costs and charges for asset management, and trading commissions are 
deducted from returns. Therefore, the returns used in this work are total net 
returns. Based on the value of financial assets at market prices, net assets 
were also expressed at market values. 
Operating costs are total charges reported in the income statement, 
net of charges related to financial management – as these are already 
discounted from returns – of provisions and amortization. 
Grants are the sum of those approved during the year and of grants 
financed by funds set aside in previous years: they are the effective grants of 





Appendix 2 – The Yale-Stanford Rule 
The Yale-Stanford rule sets spending for the current year on the basis of 
spending and of the value of net assets in the previous year, adjusted to 
account for price changes. We define:  
• S annual spending 
• V net assets (year-end) 
• P annual price growth factor (one plus annual inflation rate) 
• t time index in {0, 1, 2, 3, …} 
• x smoothing parameter in [0,1] 
• z target spending rate parameter in (0,1) 
then, the Yale-Stanford rule equation is: 
 
If the smoothing parameter x is equal to one, then the rule requires that 
spending be kept constant in real terms, regardless of the value of net assets; 
if x is equal to zero, then the rule requires that the spending in real terms be 
equal to the constant fraction z of the value of net assets. In general, the target 
spending parameter z sets the ratio of spending and net assets over the long 
term – in steady state conditions. This makes it possible to establish whether 
the spending policy is sustainable over the long term. Let R be the annual 
capitalization rate of net assets so that 
 
Then, plugging-in S from the Yale-Stanford equation we get: 
 
Let’s define: 
• G the annual growth factor of net assets 
• q the spending-to-net assets ratio (at beginning of year) 











In steady-state conditions, P and R are equal to their long-term values and G 
is constant as well. So, the steady state of the former equation is 
(superimposed bar means ‘steady-state value’): 
 
In the long-run, the current spending rate q and the target spending rate z are 
the same by definition, therefore: 
 
The left-hand side of this equation is the ratio between the annual variation 
factor of the net assets value and the annual variation factor of prices. If 
spending is exactly sustainable, that is, such as to maintain constant the 
expected real value of net assets, then: 
 
From this, the sustainability condition for spending is:  
 
For small values of the numerator and the denominator, this can be 
approximated as: 
 
 If the target spending rate equals the real return on net assets, then spending 
is exactly sustainable; if it is higher, net assets increases over time, while, if it 
is lower, they decrease*. 
Parameters x and z have the further function of regulating the extent 
to which past changes in real net assets have an impact on current spending. 
This is evident by solving the Yale-Stanford rule equation recursively by brute-
force: 
 
* Note that if x = 1 then the target spending rate z becomes irrelevant. Nevertheless, the 
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The effect of a temporary shock hitting V on S declines geometrically over 
time. As an example, Figure A1 illustrates the magnitude of this effects for 
different values of the x and z parameters at one, two, three and five years 
after the shock. Note that the effects get smaller over time but, given the same 
target spending rate, higher values of the smoothing parameter – i.e. more 
attention to stabilizing spending in the short-term – mean that they persist for 
longer, as they entail proportionally greater reductions in future net assets 
values. For given smoothing parameter, as the target spending increases, the 


















NOTE: The graphs are plotted for a change of one million euro in the value of net assets due to the volatility of investments or a shock on the level of the 
price index. The solid lines refer to a target spending rate of 4 percent, the dashed lines of 3 percent and the dotted lines of 2 percent. The four panels, 































































VARIAZIONI NELL'ANNO t – 5
Variation in t + 1 Variation in t + 2 
Variation in t + 3 
 






Appendix 3 – Further estimation results 
The tables in this appendix display the estimation results of specifications (3) to (6) of the 
linear regression equation. 
 
Table A1 
Estimates of spending policy parameters by three periods 
 
Note: Least squares estimates of spending policy parameters with 90 percent confidence 
intervals. The delta-method is used for computing confidence (Fox and Weisberg, 2019). Serial 
correlation is tested by the Durbin-Watson statistic, following Wooldridge (2002); 
Heteroscedasticity test is Breusch and Pagan’s (1979); cross-dependency is tested according 
to Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange-multiplier approach. For all three tests, errors are not 
correlated and have constant variance under the null hypothesis, so rejection casts doubt on 
the assumptions of the model which justify using least squares. The hypothesis that 
parameters are constant over the 2005-16 period is tested by the Wald procedure (Fox and 
Weisberg, 2019). 
  
Estimate 5% 95% Estimate 5% 95%
Smoothing 0.256 0.086 0.426 0.120 -0.080 0.320
Target return 2.643 2.371 2.915 2.845 2.413 3.278
Smoothing 2009-12 0.254 0.042 0.465
Smoothing 2013-16 0.544 0.287 0.801
Target return 2009-12 2.750 2.259 3.241
Target return 2013-16 2.889 2.039 3.739
Test Statistic P-value Model Statistic P-value Model
Serial correlation 2.112 0.717 N = 10 2.074 0.596 N = 10
Heteroscedasticity 1.037 0.309 T = 11 10.248 0.069 T = 11
Cross-dependency 62.785 0.049 NT = 110 64.537 0.030 NT = 110
 Model significance 6.144 0.015 DoF = 2 1.693 0.157 DoF = 8
Pooled vs. By period Statisitic = 1.693 P-value = 0.157 DoF = 4
Parameters






Estimates of spending policy parameters by two periods controlling for returns 
 
Note: Least squares estimates of spending policy parameters with 90 percent confidence 
intervals. The delta-method is used for computing confidence (Fox and Weisberg, 2019). Serial 
correlation is tested by the Durbin-Watson statistic, following Wooldridge (2002); 
Heteroscedasticity test is Breusch and Pagan’s (1979); cross-dependency is tested according 
to Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange-multiplier approach. For all three tests, errors are not 
correlated and have constant variance under the null hypothesis, so rejection casts doubt on 
the assumptions of the model which justify using least squares. The hypothesis that 
parameters are constant over the 2005-16 period is tested by the Wald procedure (Fox and 
Weisberg, 2019). 
  
Estimate 5% 95% Estimate 5% 95%
Smoothing 0.207 0.024 0.389 0.068 -0.151 0.286
Target return 2.642 2.387 2.896 2.869 2.459 3.279
Lag of return -0.004 -0.010 0.002 -0.006 -0.012 0.000
Smoothing 2009-16 0.289 0.087 0.491
Target return 2009-16 2.652 2.309 2.994
Test Statistic P-value Model Statistic P-value Model
Serial correlation 2.191 0.845 N = 10 2.240 0.887 N = 10
Heteroscedasticity 0.675 0.714 T = 11 3.246 0.518 T = 11
Cross-dependency 59.693 0.070 NT = 110 67.591 0.016 NT = 110
 Model significance 3.803 0.025 DoF = 3 2.885 0.026 DoF = 4
Pooled vs. By period Statisitic = 1.902 P-value = 0.154 DoF = 2
Parameters






Estimates of spending policy parameters by two periods 
 
Note: Least squares estimates of spending policy parameters with 90 percent confidence 
intervals. The delta-method is used for computing confidence (Fox and Weisberg, 2019). Serial 
correlation is tested by the Durbin-Watson statistic, following Wooldridge (2002); 
Heteroscedasticity test is Breusch and Pagan’s (1979); cross-dependency is tested according 
to Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange-multiplier approach. For all three tests, errors are not 
correlated and have constant variance under the null hypothesis, so rejection casts doubt on 
the assumptions of the model which justify using least squares. The hypothesis that 
parameters are constant over the 2005-16 period is tested by the Wald procedure (Fox and 
Weisberg, 2019). 
Estimate 5% 95% Estimate 5% 95%
Smoothing 0.256 0.086 0.426 0.174 -0.219 0.370
Target return 2.643 2.371 2.915 2.841 2.375 3.307
Smoothing 2009-16 0.333 0.133 0.532
Target return 2009-16 2.646 2.277 3.015
Test Statistic P-value Model Statistic P-value Model
Serial correlation 2.112 0.717 N = 10 2.111 0.694 N = 10
Heteroscedasticity 1.037 0.309 T = 11 3.624 0.305 T = 11
Cross-dependency 62.785 0.049 NT = 110 66.751 0.019 NT = 110
 Model significance 6.144 0.015 DoF = 2 2.781 0.045 DoF = 3
Pooled vs. By period Statisitic = 1.095 P-value = 0.338 DoF = 2
Parameters
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